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Metrosexual Manliness
Tocqueville's New Science of Energy
Ben Berger

Harvey C. Mansfield's Manliness generates conversation, controversy, and re
flection-the first two among the reading public, the third among his recent
students. 1 Although my cohort entered graduate school years before Mans
field began his manly project, his interests and emphases subtly influenced
our own. However, many of us chose kindred subjects-honor, thumos, love
of fame, moral courage, and, in my case, energy-without identifying them
as specifically masculine. 2 In this essay I will illuminate the role of energy
in Alexis de Tocqueville's political thought, energy that can be found in
both sexes. 3 Tocqueville's "new political science" cultivates citizens' energy,
courage, and resolve, traits that Tocqueville sometimes (but not always) as
sociates with men, yet it channels and limits them with humanity, judg
ment, and moral restraint, qualities that Tocqueville often associates with
women. Part masculine and part feminine, Tocqueville's new political sci
ence embodies a "metrosexual manliness" for the modern era.
I use the term "metrosexual" with humor but sincerity as well, and for
two reasons. 4 First, it fits: as I have noted, Tocqueville's "new political sci
ence" combines elements that Tocqueville calls masculine and feminine,
and that combination is exactly what metrosexuality addresses. 5 Second,
even faddish and silly terms can contain a grain of genuine insight if exam
ined in the proper light. The insight in this case? Human traits and virtues
can be less gender-specific than some traditionalists have supposed. Thus I
employ "metrosexual" to tweak good-naturedly the exclusive identification
of courage, thumos, and energy with manliness. Tocqueville himself makes
those identifications, but in the end he cares less that democracy feature
manly men than that it contain energetic citizens, regardless of who pro
vides the juice. 6 Energetic women can contribute to the supply without
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being labeled "manly women," a backhanded compliment if ever there was
one.
For an example of energy's gender-neutrality, consider Lady Macbeth's in
famous soliloquy:
Come, you spirits
That tend on mortal thoughts, unsex me here.
And fill me from the aown to the toe top-full
Of direst cruelty! make thick my blood;
Stop up the access and passage to remorse.
That no compunctious visitings of nature
Shake my fell purpose, nor keep peace between
The effect and it! Come to my woman's breasts.
And take my milk for gall, you murdering ministers,
V^erever in your sightless substances
You wait on nature's mischief! Come, thick night.
And pall thee in the dunnest smoke of hell,
That my keen knife see not the wound it makes,
Nor heaven peep through the blanket of the dark.
To cry "Hold, hold!"^
At first glance, Shakespeare seems to imply that masculinity accomplishes
difficult deeds but lacks the remorse and moral thoughtfulness that might
stay one's hand from evil. Femininity apparently shrinks from cruelty by na
ture and complicates immoral boldness through compunction. But closer
examination reveals a different picture. Lady Macbeth asks not to be resexed but unsexed, not for more manliness but less womanliness. She al
ready exceeds her mate in energy, resolve, and ambition; now she desires
less womanly humanity and fewer scruples. Energy can be masculine or
feminine, but energy without restraint is unsexed—neither manly nor
womanly, suitable for only a beast or a god.
Edmund Spenser's Faerie Queene contrasts Lady Macbeth's energetic vil
lainy with a more balanced heroine. Spenser's maiden knight Britomart
combines energy, courage, and physical prowess with judgment, temper
ance, and humanity. She exceeds other knights in strength and courage, un
seating Sir Guyon in a joust and walking through fire while her male con
sort holds back. But Britomart also exemplifies the virtues of chastity and
loyalty, and has the moderation to check her energies when appropriate.
During a daring, attempted rescue she encounters and heeds a mysterious
warning that prefigures Tocqueville's counsel to democracy: "Be bold, be
bold ... be not too bold."® Indeed, the maiden Britomart embodies one of
the most important ingredients in Tocqueville's new political science,
namely dynamic energy that is harnessed for worthy projects yet limited by
moral perspective and propriety.
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I do not intend to debate the masculinity or femininity of any particular
trait, nor 'to make man and woman into beings not only equal, but alike"
(for which Tocqueville himself rebukes his fellow Europeans) (DA, 573). In
other words I am not claiming that all citizens should possess both male
and female traits and virtues. 1 am interested simply in identifying those
traits that make democracy work, regardless of the sex that engenders them.
Citizens' energies, for Tocqueville, comprise one of democracy's most vital
resources. Energetic democracies might not always succeed, but enervated
democracies—the citizenry completely dependent upon its government
and "fear[ing] it will die if it makes an effort"—are sure to end badly. In
stressing that point Tocqueville articulates a concern of long standing in the
political theory tradition. Philosophers from Plato to William James have
regretted democracy's potential to go soft, to sacrifice martial discipline for
fur coats and the fatted calf. The worry is that toughness, discipline, and en
ergy may bring about commercial success that undermines the very traits
and virtues that made it possible. Warriors become merchants become
sybarites, eventually falling prey to any disciplined, energetic enemies who
raise their fists. Free regimes, in which citizens can enjoy the fruits of their
energies, require active measures (and a new political science) to prevent
their dissipation while tempering their excesses.
Public affairs will never attract citizens' energies enduringly if they do not
first attract and hold citizens' attention, so Tocqueville focuses on both of
those resources, namely energy and attention. A third resource fills out the
Tocquevillean triumvirate: long-term perspective, or what the first President
Bush once dismissed as "the vision thing." Citizens need but often lack
clear perspective on their own long-term interests, which include a sus
tained investment of attention and energy in the occasionally unappealing
business of self-government. Perspective, attention, and energy occupy a far
greater portion of Tocqueville's "new political science" than most readers
have supposed. Tocqueville's new political engineering might be an equally
appropriate description, because he aims to pool, channel, and limit citi
zens' energies through the use of various tools: institutional design, civic
education, moral suasion, and other appeals to citizens' attention, some of
which he identifies with feminine virtues rather than masculine mastery.
Too often, contemporary scholars treat Tocqueville as if he were an un
qualified enthusiast for democracy in America, overlooking his stem inti
mations that our success at self-government might be a passing phase.^ At
the very outset of Democracy in America Tocqueville sets the tone for his
project by worrying about French democracy's warped political perspective,
inadequate political attention, and insufficient political energy. Each citizen
"loses sight of the very object of his pursuits," gives "the least attention" to
understanding democracy's needs, and lacks "the courage and energy" to
preserve democratic freedom (DA, 10). In the rest of his magisterial work
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Tocqueville elaborates on the conneaions between perspective, attention,
energy, and sustainable freedom. When political attention disperses, when
political energy wanes, and when political perspective gives way to short
sighted individualism, meaningful self-government faces an uncertain fu
ture. New England circa 1830 might have put France to shame vis-a-vis selfgovernment, but American democracy too contained the seeds of
disengagement.
Tocqueville identifies both the innate impulses and the environmental
factors that impel people toward self-enclosure and the voluntary removal
of their energies from collective projects, focusing on four primary factors:
equality, materialism, individualism, and isolation.'® The latter two are in
timately related and, when taken together, resemble what we now call so
cial and political disengagement. Equality and materialism can promote
that disengagement, so they join individualism and isolation in threatening
to undermine jjolitical perspective, disperse political attention, and absorb
political energy in private pursuits. As political engagement declines—as
citizens withdraw their attention and energy from self-government in order
to focus on materialistic projects—they may appoint a third party to over
see their common affairs. The results are governmental and administrative
centralization that may undermine democratic liberty. Hence, Tocqueville's
"principal goal in writing this book has been to combat" the forces im
pelling democracy toward the related perils of civilian atomization and gov
ernmental centralization." To be clear, these perils do not stem from abu
sive government, predatory big business, or foreign adversaries; they arise
from within the citizen body. Citizens' own judgments and actions are
largely to blame because their perspective, attention, and energy are limited
and sometimes poorly invested. Nonetheless, combating disengagement is
not a matter of the government compelling citizens to participate in public
life. Attention and energy cannot be coerced or they lose their spontaneity
and power. Democratic government must try to elicit political energy and
attention with a soft touch, through persuasion, education, and induce
ment, and then channel and limit those resources responsibly, rather than
attempt the kind of excessively macho and self-defeating coercion that
"without perceiving it, drives away the object of its covetousness."'^

ENERGY

Throughout Democracy in America Tocqueville refers to energy {energie) fifty
times, giving astonishing prominence to a term more commonly found in
physics texts than in political philosophy.Tocqueville's energy describes
the motive force behind aaion, the ^el for achievement of any human
ends. Energy undergirds individual and collective action, part psychological
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and part physiological. Thus energy encompasses Aristotle's distinctions be
tween dunamis, kinesis, and energeia—human potential, aaivity, and aaualization—which are rooted in the human psyche as well as the biological
world. Energy signifies much more than mere desire, which, lacking mo
tive force behind it, cannot accomplish anything of value. Consider Tocquevilie's complaint about his homeland:
Each (Frenchman] feels the ill, but no one has the courage and energy needed to
seek something better; like the passions of old men that end only in impotence,
desires, regrets, sorrows and joys produce nothing visible or lasting. (DA, 10)

Tocqueville repeatedly claims that desire alone, without the courage, energy,
or power for actualization, leaves one's goals unfulfilled. When comment
ing on the scarcity of great learning in democracies, Tocqueville observes
that "the will to engage in these works is lacking as much as is the power"
(DA, 51). Effective work requires not only the will to choose an objea but
the energy or power to get the job done.
Is energy manly? Yes and no. By separating desire from energy Toc
queville invokes Plato's division between eras, which chooses an object for
pursuit, and thumos, which can affirm or reject the choice. Indeed, Tocqueville's energy is akin to thumos, and Tocqueville occasionally associates
it with manly virility and indomitability. Energy exists to be actualized, and
energetic characters hate illegitimate constraint or arbitrary rule. Thus Toc
queville often places energy alongside thumos's corollaries, courage and love
of freedom.*'’ Tocqueville criticizes French aristocrats for their debauched
cruelty but praises their energy, their "pride of heart," and the "manly
mores" that make them "the most resistant part of the social body."*^ Sim
ilarly, Tocqueville honors the early Native Americans as a quasi-aristocratic
race possessing "the energy of barbarism," a "proud soul," "courage," and
an "intractable love of independence."*® Energy without courage often fal
ters, as Tocqueville observed among his European contemporaries. In
France "society is tranquil ... it fears it will die if it makes an effort" (DA,
10). And in Germany Tocqueville regrets the disappearance of "the activity,
the energy, the communal patriotism, the fertile and manly virtues" that
had once been inspired by medieval laws.*^ But Tocqueville also praises
American women, "who often display a manly reason and a wholly virile
energy" while not being "manly" women. For all their energy they "gener
ally preserve a very delicate appearance and always remain women in their
manners. . .
Energy might mark American men more vividly but char
acterizes American women as well.
Governments as well as individuals require energy to aa swiftly and ef
fectively, to execute their goals and defend their independence. As the peo
ple are democracy's ruling element, the institutions of government are es
sentially tools or mechanisms for achieving the people's collective ends and
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the public good. Like all mechanisms they require inputs of energy in order
to function. Indeed, throughout his political works Tocqueville draws upon
mechanistic metaphors to hammer home the importance of institutions fu
eled by citizens' collective energy. In New England townships "everything
moves around you and nowhere do you discover the motor. The hand that
directs the social machine vanishes at each instant" (DA, 67). In the Old
Regime, Tocqueville insists that the "greamess and power of a people" can
not be adduced to "the mechanism of its laws alone; for, in this matter, it is
less the perfection of the instrument than the strength of the motors that
determines the result" (OR, 221). Collective energy is the fuel that facilitates
society's activity, supplies the "motive force" and tends the "strength of [its]
motors."^'
Motive force and activity, in turn, are closely associated with freedom it
self Consider the well-known passage in which Tocqueville inveighs
against administrative centralization:
What does it matter to me, after all, that there should be an authority always
on its feel, keeping watch that my pleasures are tranquil, flying ahead of my
steps to turn away every danger without my even needing to think about it, if
this authority, at the same that it removes the least thorns on my path, is ab
solute master of my freedom and my life, if it monopolizes movement and ex
istence to such a point that everything around it must languish when it lan
guishes, that everything must sleep when its sleeps, that everything must perish
if it dies? (DA, 88)

"Freedom" and "life" should be read as a pair, alongside "movement" and
"existence." When government is the master of the first pair, it monopolizes
the second. Thus, life parallels existence—a rather obvious equation—but
also, more provocatively, freedom parallels movement.
In his chapter on the ubiquity of energetic activity throughout the United
States Tocqueville contrasts free and non-free countries in terms of their ac
tivity. In free countries, "all is activity and movement; here [in France], all
seems calm and immobile" (DA, 231). In his eyes, "the greatest advantage
of democratic government" may be the "agitation, constantly reborn," in
troduced by democratic government and carried into civil society (DA,
233). Because energy and activity are the engines of self-government's in
dependence, political science—"that great science of government"—must
teach "how to understand the general movement of society" (OR, 199).
While energy is a capacity residing in every individual, it functions best
when utilized collectively. Energetic individuals face overwhelming odds
when they act by themselves, as shown by the case of the failed reformer:
"He exhausts himself in the wish to animate this indifferent and distraaed
crowd, and finally he sees himself reduced to powerlessness, not because he
is defeated, but because he is alone" (DA, 610). To be enduringly success
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ful, collective energy must be voluntary as well, for "{o]ne will never en
counter . . . genuine power among men except in the free concurrence of
wills" (DA, 89). Tocqueville often contrasts the efficacy of freely combined
energies with the futility of coercion. When a centralized, despotic govern
ment forces people to work toward imposed goals it courts disaster, because
it is not under such conditions that one obtains the concurrence of the hu
man will* necessary to produce "genuine power." Slavery, the ultimate co
ercion of energy and effort, is not only unjust but inefficient: "masters make
slaves work without being obliged to pay them, but they receive little fruit
from their efforts, while the money that they would give to free workers
would be recovered with interest from the value of their labors. "22 Thus,
while isolated or coerced individuals are immobile and ineffeaive, a soci
ety of energetic individuals working in overlapping projects generates an
important store of power (even if it falls short of aristocratic greatness). That
power makes possible impressive, collective efforts as well as a viable, com
mon defense against the encroaching power of domestic governments and
foreign threats.
Tocqueville's emphasis on collective energy prefigures Hannah Arendi's in
sistence on the cooperative nature of power.23 For both Tocqueville and
Arendt, energy and power must be used or risk atrophy. Should demoaatic
citizens abandon their collective, energetic pursuits, they abandon their pri
mary resource for resisting despotism's sway. While the relentless aaivity pro
duced by widespread liberty may seem frightening or exhausting, citizens
should not yield to the temptation to withdraw from public life. "I know that
in our day there are many honest people... who, fatigued by freedom, would
like to rest at last far from its storms," Tocqueville says, but "they know very
poorly the port toward which they direa themselves" (DA, 298-99).
Enei^ must reside in any regime's ruling element. Thus, healthy aristoc
racies must have an energetic nobility; healthy democracies need an ener
getic citizenry. The nobility's tastes, loves, and habits decide the goals to
ward which aristocracies direct their collective energies; in democracies,
popular tastes (and social conditions) diaate the same. Aristocracies,
moved by what Tocqueville considers to be "great" loves, can "act strongly
on all [other nations] . . . attempt great undertakings and . . . great actions.
. . ." (DA, 234-35). The resulting rewards, however, are distributed in
equitably: "The capital vice for which aristocracy is reproached is that of
working only for itself, and not for the mass" (DA, 219). Conversely, one of
the "true advantages" of democracy is that "it spreads a restive activity
through the whole social body, a superabundant force, an energy that never
exists without it, and which ... can bring forth marvels" (DA, 234). The de
mocratization of energy results in greater overall prosperity but also lower
goals, because of democracy's prosaic tastes. Nonetheless, while democ
racy s goals and achievements may not be as impressive, Tocqueville praises
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democraqr less for its outcomes than for its processes—the continual mo
tion evoked by democratic institutions and continued throughout civil
society—that he believes essential to sustaining widespread freedom.
While the people are democracy's ruling element, Tocqueville realizes
that in modern democracies citizens must delegate a share of their power to
a centralized government.^** To govern justly and well, central government
requires energy and firmness. As Madison writes in Federalist 37, "Energy in
government is essential to that security against external and internal danger,
and to that prompt and salutary execution of the laws which enter into the
very definition of good government. Tocqueville cites the Federalist ap
provingly, never disagreeing on the importance of governmental energy, but
he emphasizes a complementary point. Madison, writing during a period of
unstable, ineffective government, tries to ensure sufficient energy for the
Union. Tocqu^ille, with fifty years' hindsight, insists that energetic govern
ment must be balanced by equal energy in the citizenry. Thus, while all of
the Federalist's (thirty-one) references to political energy concern the energy
of government, all but one of Democracy in America's references to political
energy concern the energy of the people.^^
Too often, political science scholarship focuses on policy proposals and
government initiatives as if government itself were the regime's ruling ele
ment. Tocqueville's insights are a reminder that democracy's ruling element
must always be the people, and if their energy departs, so does democracy.
Even though he lacks the twentieth-century term "bureaucracy," Tocqueville
recognizes that concept as the logical and regrettable outcome should cen
tralized administration ever monopolize political enei^. Tocqueville asso
ciates bureaucratic monopoly with the end of meaningful democracy and a
likely step toward harsh or soft despotism.^^
Tocqueville frequently uses the metaphors of water and molecules to en
hance his descriptions of human relations.^® When molecules are too far
apart, their energy can dissipate or evaporate; when they are too dose to
gether, they are frozen and immobile. In Tocqueville's words, "despotism
. . . walls [citizens] up inside their private lives. They already tend to keep
themselves apart from one another: despotism isolates them; it chills their
relations; it freezes them" (OR, 87). Individuals and their political energy
require proper proximity to one another—neither the "iron bands" of des
potism nor the atomization of mass society.^^ Even with the proper distance
between its sources, energy must also be channeled effectively. Otherwise,
collected energy could flow in many directions and thus deplete its poten
tial, or could flood all at once and cause great damage. Consider Toc
queville's choice of metaphors: "municipal bodies and the administrations
of counties therefore form so many hidden shoals that delay or divide the
flood of the popular will," and political associations are a "dike against
tyranny" of the majority or of an oppressive faction (DA, 250, 192). The
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same metaphor holds regarding governmental energy. In France, Tocqueville sa>^, an inefficient system of public employment "was like an ir
regular and badly constructed dike which divided the central power's
strength and dissipated its shock" (OK, 172). If the colleaive energies are
limited and channeled toward representative institutions that allow them
expression, they can be harnessed toward useful projects and sometimes
even great ones.
If energy is such a vital component of political and economic success,
why must we limit it? Just as freedom must be circumscribed to be enjoyed
in the long term—if all people do exactly as they like, anarchy looms on the
horizon—the people's colleaive energy must be limited and channeled.
Otherwise, colleaed energy tends toward entropy. Energy that is not pooled
and direaed can stagnate or wither, just as energy that is pooled but not
limited can rage out of control and end in anarchy. Tocqueville observes
both these conditions in France before the Revolution:
... the progress of government often slowed and sometimes stopped: public
life was as suspended. At other times, it was by excess of aaivity and self-con
fidence that the new governments sinned .. . wanting to make everything bet
ter. they ended up confusing everything. (OR, 237)

Thus colleaive energy must not only be channeled toward useful projeas
but kept within appropriate limits. The most important of these limiting in
fluences include laws and political institutions, "habits of the heart" (cus
toms and mores), and one of the most important influences, organized re
ligion.Tocqueville observed American men investing their energies in the
business of commerce and politics, with women investing theirs in the
maintenance of morality and order. He was so impressed with this com
plementary pairing that he ascribed "the chief cause of the extraordinary
prosperity and growing power of this nation" to "the superiority of the
women" over their European counterparts.
Religion can restrain people's aaions within a bounded moral universe
and, perhaps more importantly, "impose a salutary control on the intellea." Absolute freedom to invest enei^ and attention can be worrisome or
even maddening. In both religion and politics, "men are soon frightened by
the limitless independence with which they are faced." In Tocqueville's view
(to which Durkheim would later assent), freely accepted limitations on
thought and aaion make meaningful freedom a possibility in the first
place.^' Faced with an endless riot of possibilities, energy would soon dissi
pate. As he puts it, "Such a state cannot fail to enervate souls; it slackens the
springs of the will and prepares citizens for servitude" (DA, 418). But while
Tocqueville credits religion for bolstering Americans' mores and hence con
fining their energies to responsible and relatively ethical pursuits, he knows
that religion itself cannot do the job. Here Tocqueville once again gives
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women and femininity pride of place, a necessary complement to, and re
straint of, masculine energy and boldness:
Religion [in the U.S.] is often powerless to restrain man in the midst of the in
numerable temptations that fortune presents to him. It cannot moderate the
ardor in him for enriching himself, which everything comes to excite, but it
reigns as a sovereign over the soul of women, and it is woman who makes
mores. (DA, 278-79)

To Tocqueville, femininity involves neither obeisance nor subservience but
a healthy acceptance of appropriate limitations. So far from being mere fol
lowers by nature, women can accept moral limitations and also lead their
restless men to compliance.^^ In this sense they embody Aristotle's concep
tion of the citizen, being ruled (by religious mores) and ruling (over their
constantly tempted husbands) in tum.^^ Thus America's moral and politi
cal landscapes are marked by restless and productive energies as well as
salutary limitations and order:
. . . everything is certain and fixed in the moral world, although the political
world seems to be abandoned to the discussion and attempts of men. So the hu
man spirit never perceives an unlimited field before itself: however bold it may
be, from time to time it feels that it ought to halt before insurmountable barri
ers. Before innovating, it is forced to accept certain primary givens and to sub
mit its boldest conceptions to certain forms that delay and halt it. (DA, 279)

Tocqueville would have it no other way; if a democracy were not both en
ergetic and limited in the American manner, its leaders would have to find
other ways of making it so. Late in volume two Tocqueville reiterates, "One
must try to pose the farthest boundaries for [ambition] in advance that it
will never be permitted to cross; but one ought to guard against hindering
its ascent too much within the permitted limits" (DA, 604). Combining
masculine energy and feminine respect for limitations (as well as the femi
nine energy needed to enforce moral restraint), the America that Toc
queville commends indeed recalls Spenser's counsel to Britomart: "be bold,
be bold ... be not too bold."
Tempering boldness with judgment requires not only the respect for lim
itations that religious observance can reinforce, but also a long-term per
spective on the well-being of the individual and the community, a trait that
Tocqueville links more closely with women than with men.
PERSPECTIVE
Among its several roles. Democracy in America is a meditation on vision.
Throughout that work (and also in the Old Regime) Tocqueville draws on
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metaphors of clear and far-reaching vision, and contrasting imagery of
blindness and obfuscation.^-^ in Democracy in America he proposes "to see
not differently but further," and in the Old Regime he desires "to see into the
heart of the old regime, so close to us in years, but hidden from us by the
Revolution" (OR, Preface, 84). Further, on more than a dozen occasions in
Democracy in America Tocqueville distinguishes what is apparent "at first
glance" ("au premier coup d'oeil") and what turns out to be true upon "more
attentive examination" (DA, 70, 416). Those choices underscore Tocqueville's deep concern with democracy's long-term perspective and the fac
tors that habitually cloud its sight.
Every legitimate regime requires a long-term perspective on the goals it
can sustain and the means necessary to achieve them. Aristocracy, in spite
of its many shortcomings, is well equipped for clear vision. At its best, aris
tocracy can set glorious, far-reaching goals, form the sound judgment nec
essary to pursue them, and achieve fruition by overcoming short-term de
sires. Government by nobility, "master of itself... is not subjea to getting
carried away in passing distractions; it has long designs that it knows how
to ripen until a favorable occasion presents itself" (DA, 222).^5 For all de
mocracy's advantages over aristocracy—most notably, its greater justice—
long-term perspective frequently eludes its grasp. Tocqueville notes that "it
is this clear perception of the future, founded on enlightenment and expe
rience, that democracy will often lack" (DA, 214).36 Why should this be the
case? Citizens have a difficult time judging appropriate long-term goals for
their society because their materialistic desires direct them toward present
satisfactions, and because the immediacy of those desires undermines the
deep reflection required of good judgment. As Tocqueville laments, "In cen
turies in which almost everyone acts, one is therefore generally brought to
attach an excessive value to rapid sparks and superficial conceptions of the
intellea and, on the contrary, to depreciate immoderately its profound,
slow work" (DA, 435). Further, most people "see less clearly than the upper
classes what they can hope or fear from the future," in part because democ
racies lack a class of life-long statesmen, imbued with a respea for past and
future generations (DA, 214). Thus, most citizens lack the aristocratic elites'
experience with public affairs. Not only that, but democracy's "natural in
stincts"—its love of equality and mistrust of superiority—"bring the people
to keep distinguished men away from power" (DA, 189). For their part,
these distinguished figures often shun public office, either to avoid its fre
quent tawdriness or to pursue greater fortunes in private life.
Despite these obstacles, democracy must develop and sustain some kind
of clear perspective on its long-term interests, its achievable desires, and the
appropriate relationship of citizens to one another.^^ Tocqueville calls this
the "doctrine of self-interest well understood." Note: "well" understood,
not "best" understood. Less rigorous than Aristotle's virtue of practical wisdom
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{phronisis), which evaluates virtuous ends and the means to achieve
them, self-interest well understood—which I identify with democratic
"perspective"—takes the people's ends as given and evaluates the means
to achieve them imperfectly but enduringly. Self-interest well understood
is "general theory" that helps Americans "to combine their own well-be
ing with that of their fellow citizens" (DA, 501). It dictates that individ
uals pay attention to and aa in accordance with those norms "appropri
ate to the times," which include toleration, reciprocity, cooperation, and
interpersonal trust. It tells citizens that they must help each other in or
der to accomplish their own ends, even if they find cooperation tem
porarily unpleasant.
As Tocqueville describes it, "enlightened self-love continually leads them
to help one another and disposes them freely to give part of their time and
wealth for fhe good of the state." Tocqueville endorses self-interest well un
derstood as a flawed but undeniably useful asset that is the best moral doc
trine available to most people.^® The doctrine of self-interest well under
stood and its corollary norms are democratic virtues because, while they do
not diaate phenomenal sacrifices or individual excellence, they are accessi
ble and appealing to all. In their absence—should citizens no longer be
touched or moved by "those great and powerful public emotions" that can
motivate communal undertakings or the mingling of self-interest with the
commonweal—self-government and democratic freedom would be jeop
ardized (DA, 616).
Tocqueville claims that among Americans the doctrine of self-interest
well understood had "come to be universally accepted," but acceptance
does not equal active emulation; it may mean that people pay attention to
social and moral norms without an energetic follow-throu^ (DA, 526).
Tocqueville's observations imply that a citizenry steered by self-interest well
understood is more of an ideal than an empirical observation.®^ In practice,
long-term vision often falters:
Do not say to men that in giving themselves over so blindly to an exclusive pas
sion, they compromise their dearest interests; they are deaf. Do not show them
that freedom escapes from their hands while they are looking elsewhere; they
are blind, or rather they perceive only one good in the whole universe worth
longing for (DA, 481).'*°

In other words, it must be hoped but cannot be guaranteed that the people
will have a taste for what they truly need. We might hope that reason or cal
culation will inform or shape desire, but we cannot always depend on it.^'
(The Constitution represents one institution by which the people decide, in
advance, what they are not allowed to desire.'*^) For all his attention to the
doctrine of interest rightly understood, and his insistence that people must
be educated to its tenets, Tocqueville does not expect reason alone to clar-
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ify democracy's ^sion and forge its morals. Reason requires the additional
influence of moderate habituation and the restraint provided by organized
temper people's desires and help to enlarge their perspec
tives^ Together with these supporting influences, self-interest well under
stood may not put reason in the seat of power but may make passions and
interests more reasonable.^**
Here women enter the picture again. If democracies tend toward my
opia—constantly in need of moderation and religiously based restraint—
democratic women can bring a corrective perspective. Tocqueville repeat
edly highlights women's clear vision:
. before she has entirely left childhood she already thinks for herself, speaks
freely, and
alone; the great piaure of the world is constantly exposed be
fore her; far from seeking to conceal the view of it from her, they uncover more
and more of it to her regard every day and teach her to consider it with a firm
and tranquil eye. Thus the vices and perils that society presents are not slow to
be revealed to her; she sees them clearly, judges them without illusion, and
563)

‘s full of confidence in her strength.. . . (DA,

Seeing dearly the risks, rewards, and requirements of life in a democracy
Tocqueville s young women are bold but not too bold. "[Ijn the very midst
of the independence of her first youth," he writes, "the American woman
never entirely ceases to be mistress of herself; she enjoys all permitted plea
sures without abandoning herself to any of them, and her reason does not
drop the reins although it often seems to let them dangle" (DA, 564). These
women are no shrinking violets, and they contribute their own energies to
the democratic engine. Tocqueville's women shape democracy's mores—
which limit the uses to which its energies can be put-and face reversals of
fortune mth strength of will," "courage," and "tranquil and indomitable
energy (DA, 566-67).
'^is is not to say that Tocqueville envisions women holding public office
and directing the commonwealth with their judgment and candor. Rather
he sees them cloistered" in the domestic circle, exerting a salutary influence
behind the scenes. Tlie point that 1 wish to stress is that for Tocqueville
long-term perspective, stable mores, and educated moderation are vital in^
lluences on democratic energy: "republicans in the United States ... profess
the opinion that a people ought to be moral, religious, and moderate to the
degree it is free" {DA, 379). Tocqueville happens to associate the influences
of morality, religion, and moderation with women, so in his "new political
science the feminine complements the masculine. But even if one were to
contest his identification of those influences with women, his prescription
for democratic health—his insistence that those influences be present—
would remain just as cogent.
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Moderation and restraint are seldom aligned with nobility and greatness,
as Tocqueville occasionally laments. Nonetheless, democracy's special ex
cellence resides in its potential for facilitating widespread freedom—the
freedom to invest time, energy, and attention as individuals see fit. But to
fulfill that potential, citizens must invest attention and energy not only
freely but wisely, with an eye toward sustainability and long-term conse
quences. Otherwise, conditions of maximal freedom can produce condi
tions in which that freedom disappears for "by demanding too much free
dom one gets too much slavery.

ATTENTION
Every regime's ruling element must attend to political affairs. Without po
litical attention; colleaive problems and public interests would go without
redress. Encroachments against liberty would proceed unchecked. And yet
in modem times, representative democracy has become virtually synony
mous with delegated political attention. Citizens elect representatives to
look after political affairs and turn their own attention to other pursuits.
Tocqueville fears that energy will accompany attention in the headlong
flight from political affairs and self-government. In his understanding—and
this is extremely important if we are to grasp Tocqueville's "new political sci
ence"—energy generally follows attention. If a subject does not hold peo
ple's attention it will not enduringly attract their energy and activity. If the
people's attention, and hence energy and activity, leave the political realm
altogether, they are left with a government that "monopolizes movement
and existence to such a point that everything around it must languish when
it languishes . . ." (DA, 88).
Tocqueville considers whether attention might follow reason or rational
self-interest—in other words, whether people tend to pay attention to issues
and activities that affect their long-term interests as well as short-term de
sires. Unfortunately for democracy and political engagement, attention is
largely a function of tastes—and while tastes can be educated by reason and
shaped by moral values those educative influences have their limits.'**’ In
most instances attention follows tastes, and energy follows attention.^^ A
taste for freedom might direct attention and energy to self-government, but
a passion for material well-being, leisure, or for being left alone may divert
democracy's resources {and influence its political health) in a different direaion altogether.^® Tocqueville implies that people can only be engaged
with—that is, active in and attentive to—a limited number of issues or con
cerns. He finds Americans to be completely consumed by their activities,
saying that "not only are (Americans] occupied, but they have a passion for
their occupations. They are perpetually in action, and each of their actions
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absorbs their soul; the fire they put into affairs prevents them from being
inflamed by ideas" (DA, 614). Because of their many dislraaions they do
not even pay much heed to respected leaders and officials: "when one has
acquired the confidence of a democratic people, it is still a great affair to get
its attention [d'obtenir son attention]" (DA, 614). Political affairs must com
pete with commerce, entertainment, and the pleasures of private life for the
scarce resources of attention and energy. To attract attention and energy
they must appeal to people's tastes. As early as 1832, then, Tocqueville
warns that we should not be surprised to see politics-as-spectacle:
When he has been drawn out of himself, he therefore always expeas that he is
going to be offered some enormous objea to look at, and it is only at this price
that he consents to tear himself for a moment from the small, complicated
cares that agitate and charm his life. (DA, 464)

Commerce gives politics stiff competition for citizens' limited attention
and energy. Commerce appeals not only to Americans' taste for material
goods but for the impassioned aaivity that is sometimes associated with
politics. "In democracies there is nothing greater nor more brilliant than
commerce," Tocqueville writes, "it is what attracts the regard of the public
and fills the imagination of the crowd; all energetic passions are direaed to
ward it."'’® The danger is apparent, namely that commerce or other "bril
liant" involvements may charm popular attention away from involvement
with self-government, even though the latter channels, pools, and mingles
people's energies, upholds democratic freedom, and hence enables pursuit
of commerce in the first place.
In special instances politics may outpace its competitors. Political crises,
for instance, can focus citizens' attention on political affairs. But as soon as
the trouble has passed, attention and energy wander after tastes once again.
Further, the focusing effect of crises is not only impermanent but also in
determinate. Crisis can focus attention and energy on self-government and
the common defense, but can just as easily disperse them.^^ Tocqueville
writes of the American Revolution and aftermath:
It was this very prosperity that began to make people lose sight of the cause
that had produced it; the danger having passed, Americans no longer found in
themselves the energy and patriotism that had helped to ward it off. Delivered
from the fears that had preoccupied them, they readily reverted to the ordinary
tendency of their penchants. (DA, 371)

For all these reasons Tocqueville fears that democratic citizens will always
struggle to focus their attention on political affairs, and hence will always
be at risk of a political energy crisis.
When citizens withdraw their attention and energy from public and collec
tive affairs they court a condition that Tocqueville calls isolation, a condition
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that can encourage the warped perspective of individualism (and ultimately
egoism]. And in spite of his current fame as a civil society enthusiast, Tocqueville is much more concerned with avoiding radical isolation and indi
vidualism than with promoting unlimited associationism and community.
Political associations and social togetherness have their downsides, the for
mer potentially undermining political order and the latter potentially
quashing free thought and expression. Political engagement is not guaran
teed to teach the art of ruling well. Township government is inefficient and
messy, and in pre-revolutionary France associations contributed to a thor
oughly un-civic culture. But while political engagement brings uncertain re
wards, widespread political disengagement almost certainly undermines po
litical capacities and self-government. We need look no further than the
eighteenth<entury French intellectuals who lacked any exposure to aaive
engagement, and who viewed politics from an "almost infinite distance
from practice" (Oi?, 197). Their fellow citizens, had no "daily involve[ment]
in regional administration," and hence were susceptible to the extraordi
narily bad political advice, the "contempt for existing facts," that French in
tellectuals offered them (OR, 195-202). Tocqueville suggests that the
French Revolution's excesses were due in no small measure to the debili
tated political perspective resulting from widespread political disengagement.
« j r
Political energy suffers as well as political and moral perspective. By deiinition, isolated citizens withdraw their energy and attention from public
affairs. Tocqueville wonies that isolated energies may not only stagnate but
diminish. As we saw earlier, Tocqueville suggests that in the absence of con
tinual agitation and progress, energy tends toward disuse and atrophy. En
ergy responds with special ardor to circumstances that allow for personal
disUnction, but isolated individuals are out of the game. Energy unused be
comes energy squandered, at both the individual and the collective level.
If citizens continue to confine themselves more and more narrowly in the cir
cle of small domestic interests, there to become agitated without rest, one can
apprehend that in the end they will become almost inaccessible to those great
and powerful public emotions that trouble peoples, but develop and renew
them. (DA, 616)

Tocqueville worries not simply that people will fail to exercise the great and
powerful public emotions" that stir them, but that, through this inactivity,
the rousing force may become "practically out of reach even if the people
want or need them. "Ambition may lose both its spark and its greatness,
base materialism may "loosen the springs of action, and an enervated peo
ple may lose the ability even to maintain its independence, let alone ac
complish anything of lasting importances^
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The conditions of social equality promote political disengagement in the
form of individualism and isolation. Equality "tends to isolate [men] from
one another and to bring each of them to be occupied with himself
alone.But equality also "lays open their souls excessively to the love of
material enjoyments," and materialism is Tocqueville's fourth great concern
for sustainable self-government (DA, 419). Under conditions of social
equality most individuals could never hope to achieve fame or political
power. But wealth and material pleasures are available to many, and thus
conditions of social equality encourage pursuit of worldly goods: "The
same causes that render citizens independent of one another push them
every day toward new and restive desires and spur them constantly" (DA,
607).53
Materialism, in turn, can increase citizens' isolation. We seek privacy in
which to enjoy the fruits of our labor, and the experience of private enjoy
ment sharpens our desires. "[Tjhese objects are small," Tocqueville says,
"but the soul clings to them: it considers them every day and from very
close; in the end they hide the rest of the world from it, and they sometimes
come to place themselves between it and God" (DA, 509). In American and
also French democracy he laments the increasing "desire to enrich oneself
at any price, the preference for business, the love of profit, the search for
material pleasure and comfort. ..." These "most widespread desires" often
"occupy men's minds and turn them away from public affairs ..." (OR, 87).
Materialism damages all three of the qualities that Tocqueville's new po
litical science seeks to promote—perspective, energy, and attention. The
"blind passion" for wealth perverts political perspective and self-interest
well understood:
Preoccupied with the sole care of making a fortune, they no longer perceive the
tight bond that unites the particular fortune of each of them to the prosperity
of all. There is no need to tear from such citizens the rights they possess; they
themselves willingly allow them to escape. The exercise of their political duties
appears to them a distressing contretemps that distracts them from their in
dustry. .. . These people believe they are following the doctrine of interest, but
they have only a coarse idea of it, and to watch better over what they call their
affairs, they neglea the principal one, which is to remain masters of themselves
(DA, 515).

Material desires focus on immediate or imminent satisfactions while dem
ocratic freedom requires long-term perspective on citizens' interests. Imme
diate satisfactions are also easy pickings, and, because they do not require
well-invested energy, a life of short-term gratification lets energy stagnate.
Early in Demoaacf in America, in an apparently unimportant account of
South Sea islands, Tocqueville foreshadows his concern with democracy's
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enervating materialism. In the tropical "enchanted places," where every
thing "seemed prepared for the needs of man or calculated for his plea
sures," Tocqueville identifies "a certain enervating influence that attached
man to the present and rendered him careless of the future" (DA, 22). He
reiterates similar worries throughout the following political analyses. Indi
viduals absorbed with material pleasures are "more prone to become ener
vated than debauched," and one finds at the collective level a kind of "hon
est materialism that does not corrupt souls, but softens them and in the end
quietly loosens all their tensions" (DA, 509).
For the time being, Tocqueville's Americans maintain their springs' taut
ness by investing their energies in cooperative projects and thus looking af
ter their own affairs (as far as possible). Tocqueville addresses three differ
ent kinds of participation that modem scholarship often includes under the
catch-all mbric of "civic engagement": township administration, political
associations, «nd civil associations. In Tocqueville's eyes, they are particu
larly desirable because they all attract and embody citizens' collective polit
ical attention and energy. This differentiates them from aaivities such as
voting, which some political scientists regard as the quintessential measure
of political participation. For Tocqueville, political participation is good in
sofar as it means that citizens' attention and energy are focused on their
common affairs and the business of self-government. Were political partic
ipation to consist primarily in periodic voting—even if most citizens par
ticipated—Tocqueville would lament the declining habits and spirits of in
dependence, as when he remarks that "citizens quit their state of
dependence just long enough to choose their masters and then fall back
into it" (DA, 693). Tocqueville's preference for political participation that
directly involves citizens' energies in cooperative activities and self-govern
ment speaks to the recent political science literature that highlights socalled voter ignorance. This literature questions whether citizens know
enough about complex national politics to do more good than harm.^** Yet
even if today's citizens truly are politically ignorant—and here I take no
stance—it would not make Tocqueville's vision of demoaacy less feasible.
Citizens participating directly in self-government and local administration
do not exhibit die kinds of ignorance that some political scientists fear. Not
only does direct participation in local affairs involve citizens' attention and
energies in self-government to a far greater extent than periodic voting, but
it puts those energies to a more efficacious use.
Tocqueville's chapter on American townships is probably the most
commonly consulted section of his most famous book. Democracy in
America. Nonetheless, scholars seldom cite more than a line or two from
that chapter, and even less commonly do they situate it within the context
of Tocqueville's larger project (which must also include the Old Regime).
For those reasons it merits extensive consideration. Tocqueville lauds the
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township system because it provides incentives for self-serving men to be
come public-serving citizens. Note: men and not women, because Tocqueville portrays the township's lures as specifically appealing to male
ambitions and vanities.
The political engagement of township administration does not begin as
public-spiritedness or virtue. Rather, Tocqueville describes nineteenth-cen
tury Americans as what rational choice theorists might call "utility-maxi
mizing" individuals, who turn their attention and energy to cooperative
ventures when the individual benefits are obvious and the costs of partici
pating are low.ss Desire and taste are the initial lures: "desire for esteem, the
need of real interests, the taste for power and for attention" "excite men's
interest" to the township's ample resources.^® The township is "the princi
ple of public administration" in New England because it is "the hearth
around which the interests and affections of men come to gather" (DA, 76).
While Tocqueville observes that township government "is to [citizens'] taste
as well as of their choice," in truth it is "of their choice" because it is suited
to their tastes (DA, 65).
The existence of local resources provides only part of citizens' motiva
tion to participate. Even prodigious rewards, if inaccessible, rarely excite
people's attention or energy. For example, since federal offices and their
significant power are extremely difficult to attain, "ambition cannot make
them the permanent goal of its efforts" (DA, 64). The township's resources,
however, are not only ample but readily available. The citizen sees the
township as "a free and strong corporation that he is a part of and that is
worth his trouble to seek to direct," and so a great number of people "ex
ploit the power of the township for their profit and take interest in it for
themselves" (DA, 64). To use the language of modern scholarship, town
ship administration attracts citizens' attention and energies by convincing
them of their "political efficacy.
Once the township's "advantages" have "excited men's interest" and "attractjed] the ambitious passions of the human heart," the average citizen
places his ambition and his future" in township administration—invests
his attention and energy—sharing there in decision and office (DA, 63-65).
Earlier I noted Tocqueville's insistence that individual energies must be
pooled, limited, and channeled toward useful ends. The township serves
those purposes admirably. By appealing to the tastes and hence attracting
the attention and energy of self-interested individuals, it embodies "inde
pendence and power" and engenders "a continual, but at the same time
peaceful, movement that agitates [society] without troubling it" (DA,
63-65).
The initially selfish engagement holds transformative potential, because
tastes can be shaped and perspective can be educated.The experience of
cooperative engagement enlarges citizens' political perspective by drawing
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them outside of themselves and their narrow concerns. Those pursuing
short-term resources come to realize that their long-term self-interest re
quires continued political engagement: this is self-interest well understood.
Even when people manage public affairs "very badly"—which is often the
case, in Tocqueville's view—"the people cannot meddle in public affairs
without having the scope of their ideas extended and without having their
minds be seen to go outside their ordinary routine" (DA, 233). The citizen
engaged with local government "finally assembles clear and practical ideas
on the nature of his duties as well as the extent of his rights" (DA, 65).
The political engagement of township administration can set in motion
a beneficial, self-reinforcing cycle (or "virtuous circle"). As citizens experi
ence self-government and the pleasures of local freedom they develop a
stronger taste for the same, and grow better equipped to identify encroach
ments by hostile powers.^^ And as they treat "common problems in com
mon," their tnitially self-involved perspectives often widen to include no
tions of duty and reciprocal responsibility. The experience of
self-government enlarges political competence as well as political perspec
tive. Just as juries are schools for citizenship, "the institutions of a township
are to freedom what primary schools are to science; they put it within reach
of the people" because they "make them taste [freedom's] peaceful employ
and habituate them to making use of it" (DA, 57). For Tocqueville, handson experience can teach political responsibility and the necessity of selfgovernment in a uniquely powerful way, and townships provide a much
more accessible venue than state or national governments. Thus, "in this re
stricted sphere that is within his reach," the locally engaged citizen "tries to
govern society" (DA, 65).
Nonetheless, local self-government is frequently inefficient and messy, al
though in Tocqueville's view its benefits more than outweigh the costs. He
compares efficient, centralized administration in France to American town
ships "whose budgets are not drawn up on methodical and above all uni
form plans," and sides strongly with the latter, saying that
1 see most of those French communes, whose accountancy is so perfea,
plunged in a profound ignorance of their true interests and left in such an in
vincible apathy that society seems rather to vegetate than to live in them; on
the other hand, I perceive in those same American townships ... an enlight
ened, aaive, enterprising population; ! contemplate a society always at work
there. (DA, 87-88n)

France's centralized efficiency, which monopolizes administration, lacks
each of the essential political goods that I have associated with political en
gagement: political perspective ("ignorance of their true interests"), politi
cal attention ("invincible apathy"), and political energy or motion ("rather
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to vegetate than to live"). America's messy townships, in which average cit
izens administer common affairs, produce the opposite results despite their
inefficiencies.
But as Tocqueville realizes, inefficient engagement is a hard sell with
commercially oriented citizens, even if it promotes long-term self-interest.
Much more likely is a rapid loss of patience with local governments' un
tidiness and inefficiency for "the exercise of their political duties" may
come to seem "a distressing contretemps that distracts them from their in
dustry" (DA, 515). Impatience may lead citizens to delegate administration
to an efficient, centralized power and precede a descent into soft despotism.
Tocqueville extends his analysis of associations beyond the "municipal
freedoms" of township administration to include the attentive activity of
political associations. While township administration constitutes formal
government—an institution of the state—political associations are of pri
vate origin, and "owe their birth and development only to individual will"
(DA, 180). Tocqueville's political associations are thoroughly instrumental:
An association consists solely in the public adherence that a certain number of
individuals give to such and such a doctrine, and in the engagement in which
they contract to cooperate in a certain fashion to make it prevail. (DA, 181)

The motivation to associate has nothing to do with citizens' expressing an
intrinsically political human nature or fulfilling their highest capacities, as
civic republican theorists sometimes portray it. Rather, stated in mechanis
tic terms, "the association gathers the efforts of divergent minds in a cluster
and drives them vigorously toward a single goal clearly indicated by it" (DA,
181).
Individually, political associations have any number of ends; categori
cally, they serve one overarching purpose. Political associations are sites of
resistance, those institutions "by which men seek to defend themselves
against the despotic action of the majority or the encroachments of . . .
power." While a citizen might join any particular political association to
support a "specific doctrine," he or she learns there a more general "art of
uniting with those like him to defend (his freedom]" at the very time when
each has become "individually weaker" and "incapable in isolation of pre
serving his freedom" (DA, 489). Political associations form a "dike . . .
against tyranny" of the centralized government or an oppressive democratic
majority (DA, 184). They aa analogously to powerful individuals in aristo
cratic nations:
A political, industrial, commercial, or even scientific and literary association is
an enlightened and powerful citizen whom one can neither bend at will nor
oppress in the dark and who, in defending its particular rights against the exi
gencies of power, saves common freedoms. (DA, 668)
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Tocqueville differentiates between those political associations with a social
element and those whose bond is "purely intellectual," the latter apparently
resembling what present-day scholars call "mailing list associations.
Only in those political associations where members meet personally can
ideas and opinions be "the force and heat that written thought can never at
tain" (DA, 181).
Tocqueville also implies that many political associations, being funda
mentally insular and partisan, do not promote moral virtues such as gener
alized tolerance and mutual respect. Political associations can actually en
courage moral disengagement because, as in France, sometimes members
"profess the dogma of passive obedience" or make "the entire sacrifice of
their judgment and their free will in a single stroke," and this "very much
diminishes their moral force" (DA, 186). This is not to say that political as
sociations ar^ immoral or amoral, or that political associations cannot in
volve moral engagement. But in general they do not "enlarge the heart" in
the manner of nonpolitical, and often nonpartisan, civil associations.
Indeed, Tocqueville only guardedly advocates freedom of political asso
ciation. Political associations can promote democratic freedom, and for
bidding them would harm associational life generally, but they bring prob
lems along with benefits. Precisely because they are energetic and partisan
sites of resistance, a bulwark against tyranny of the majority, they can also
threaten stability and order. The degree of their utility depends on the larger
societal context. Tocqueville finds political associations necessary and good
in nineteenth-century America because Americans enjoy long-standing tra
ditions of non-violent association and deliberation. Further, in America
"opinions differ only by nuances" so violent stmggles are (in general) un
common (DA, 185). France, conversely, lacks America's stable mores and
traditions; there, political associations are viewed as catalysts to aaion and
often violence, real threats to the political order. The political engagement
of political associations may or may not support healthy democracy, de
pending on a nation's prior resources and traditions. If nothing else, Tocqueville's observations should chasten those contemporary political scien
tists who look to the American system as a model for developing
democracies worldwide.
Too often, contemporary political scientists and political theorists treat
membership in political and social associations under the single rubric of
"civic engagement," as if it were all the same thing.®^ Tocqueville, con
versely, takes pains to distinguish between political and civil associations,
with the latter encompassing "the associations that are formed in civil life
and which have an object that is in no way political" (DA, 489). Many con
temporary civic engagement scholars insist that participation in nonpoliti
cal organizations stimulates political involvement and interest.®^ TTigy sgj.
dom realize that Tocqueville made that point first. He shows how civil
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associations can enlarge citizens' moral as well as political perspeaive by
bringing people together, emphasizing their commonality, and demystify
ing their differences. Civil associations are essential because "[s]entiments
and ideas renew themselves, the heart is enlarged, and the human mind is
developed only by the reciprocal action of men upon one another" (DA,
491). Once citizens learn the art of associating for civil purposes they may
put it to political uses: "civil associations therefore facilitate political asso
ciations; but on the other hand, political association singularly develops
and perfects civil association" (DA, 496). However, civil associations can
just as easily divert people's attention and energy from political involvement.^3
associations can stabilize society by developing
the art of association while balancing the agitation of political associations.
This much is clean both political and civil associations are extremely im
portant for demoaacies' health. Political associations develop the art of selfgovernance, the love of liberty, and the ability to resist encroachments against
it. Civil associations further promote the art of associating even as they divert
some of society's copious energy away from immediate investment in politics,
thus "keep[ing] society on the move" without excessive political agitation or
instability. If pressed to choose between the two, however, Tocqueville comes
down firmly on the civil side. Political associations are key contributors in cer
tain kinds of demoaatic environments, namely democracies with long tradi
tions of stable, constitutional government and rule of law. Yet in newly de
mocratizing countries political associations may undermine stability and
promote civil chaos. Moreover, both stable and developing democracies
could probably survive the loss of their political associations for quite a while,
although they would likely suffer in the long run. But no democracy could en
dure the absence of civil associations' transmission of cooperative norms and
social connectedness. Tocqueville fears for "the morality and intelligence of a
democratic people" if government were to crowd out private associations, but
not \f political associations were imperiled (DA, 491).
At any rate, in Tocqueville's United States both the political participation
of township administration and political associations, and the social en
gagement of civil associations (which reciprocally reinforces political par
ticipation), keep citizens' attention and energy focused on self-government.
The perspective of self-interest well understood steers people toward that
productive engagement and away from the corrosive individualism and iso
lation that can undermine democratic freedom. For these reasons American
democracy resists, for the time being, the corrosive influences that Toc
queville glimpses more fully in his native France. Nonetheless, Tocqueville
can only muster muted optimism about democracy in America, and even
less than that about democracy in Europe. For all its merits, American de
mocracy seems to represent an unstable equilibrium that might easily be
tilted toward excessive inattention, enervation, and disengagement. Why?
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First, the township sj^tem that earns Tocqueville's praise comprised only
a fraction of American democracy. Tocqueville himself admits that "one
must not extend indiscriminately to the whole Union what 1 say about New
England" regarding public education and civic perspective (DA, 289). In
Southern slaveholding states and in the sparsely populated Western territo
ries he finds little of New England's established civic habits and tastes, fo
cused political attention, and usefully channeled energies.*^** Indeed, in
slaveholding Kentucky, the average citizen "has the tastes of idle men," and
since attention and energy follow tastes "he pursues fortune less than agi
tation and pleasure, and he applies in this direction the energy that his
neighbor [in free Ohio] deploys elsewhere . . (DA, 333). Further, Amer
ica's West represents "democracy reaching its furthest limit," with few social
networks and no civic traditions. “The new states of the West already have
inhabitants" but "society does not yet exist there" (DA, 50). Thus while
many present-day political scientists quote only a few enthusiastic passages
from Democracy in America praising Americans' public-spiritedness and po
litical engagement, they do not capture the entire picture.
Second, even the civic-minded regions such as New England are marked
by intense dedication to commerce and material gain. Excessive love of
those pursuits threatens to crowd out civic attention and absorb all avail
able energy, regardless of the religious influences that can sometimes keep
materialism in check. In spite of civic traditions and norms of cooperation,
if people love their private pursuits sufficiently they always flirt with the
temptation to delegate public business to a professional bureaucracy and
withdraw into their individual worlds.
Finally, tastes change. Tocqueville's Americans exhibit a strong taste for
public life and political engagement. 'They find it a pleasurable diversion:
To meddle in the government of society and to speak about it is the greatest
business and, so to speak, the only pleasure that an American knows . . .
women themselves often go to political assemblies and, by listening to politi
cal discourses, take a rest from household tedium. For them, clubs replace the
ater-going to a certain point. (DA, 232)^®

Elsewhere, Tocqueville tells us that "there are still only a few [Americans]
who go [to the theater]" (DA, 468). We are left to wonder whether Ameri
cans' civic attention is likely to survive once theater-going catches up with
clubs and political assemblies in popular esteem and entertainment value.®®
Do popular tastes comprise a sufficient hook on which to hang one's hopes
for enduring, widespread civic attention and ensuing civic artivity? The an
swer is discouraging. In great detail Tocqueville chronicles the fickleness of
popular tastes,®^ and we can surmise that while at the time of his writing
Americans comprised a remarkably engaged citizenry—both active in and
attentive to treating "common problems in common"—he does not expect
their tastes, attention, and hence energies to seek out public affairs forever:
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Not only do they (demoaatic citizens] not naturally have the taste to occupy
themselves with the public, but often they lack the time to do it. Private life is
so active in democratic times, so agitated, so filled with desires and work, that
hardly any energy or leisure remains to each man for political life. (DA, 643)

In American democracy Tocqueville observes a relentless activity ("men
never stay still") encouraged by the relatively new, and sometimes over
whelming, impact of free choice and independence. Able to choose their
occupations, business, and leisure pursuits Americans become jacks of
many trades but masters of nonets While political power or lasting fame
may be out of the question, myriad material goods are not. The American
"therefore does all things in haste," and "he insists on knowing very quickly
rather than on knowing well" (DA, 584).
Of course, these limitations apply to politics as well as business and
leisure pursuits. While Tocqueville famously praises Americans' political
participation, few scholars acknowledge this biting accompaniment: "their
actions are often ill-considered because they give but little time and atten
tion to each matter." In faa, with remarkable prescience Tocqueville de
scribes something like what we now call "information overload," or the
"sort of ignorance that is bom of extreme publicity ... in demoaatic na
tions (people) often aa at random because one wanted to say everything to
them." Because attention is limited but political information is vast, "the
principal features of each piaure disappear for the latter among the multi
tude of details (DA, 583). Tocqueville depicts a manic pace and shallow
depth of daily life that could just as easily apply to today's society, and he
closes with the powerful but little-known pronouncement that "[t]he habit
of inattention ought to be considered the greatest vice of the democratic
mind" (DA, 584). Since Tocqueville strongly suggests that energy follows at
tention, political inattention threatens political lethargy.
Thus, Tocqueville views the United States not as a model polity that will
show the world how to avoid demoaacy's perils but rather as an impressive
but unstable balancing act. It stands in a tenuous equilibrium maintained
(for the moment) by an interplay of culture, ideology, tastes, habits, and po
litical institutions, all of which can change and hence upset the civic bal
ance. Indeed, nine years after his initial visit to America Tocqueville ends
volume II with the very same worries that had inaugurated volume I: lack
of political attention, which he calls the "general apathy"; and a generalized
enervation that could lead future democracies into despotism or anarchy.
He writes,
Both (license or tyranny, anarchy or despotism) are equally to be feared, and
can as easily issue from one and the same cause, which is general apathy, the
fruit of individualism ... What it is important to combat is therefore much less
anarchy or despotism than the apathy that can create the one or the other al
most indifferently. (DA, 704)®^
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The soft despotism of a "schoolmaster" government "hinders, restrains, en
ervates, stifles, and stultifies" inattentive individualists. So in spite of Amer
ican democracy's countervailing forces, the continual pull of individualism
and isolation gives Tocqueville concern for its future prospects.^°
Almost two centuries later, a glance at present-day political science schol
arship shows these same worries hard at work. We are told that political par
ticipation and "social capital" are declining and that democracy might suf
fer as a consequence, with the apparent presumption that we were once
better off.^^ But Tocqueville helps us to understand that democracy has long
struggled—and perhaps always will stmggle—with the amount of energy
that citizens dedicate to self-government and cooperative endeavors. In
deed, Tocqueville's concept of "energy" (and his concern about its supply)
lays the ground for Robert Putnam's influential writings on "social capital."
At the individual level, energy is the most important ingredient of what
economists and sociologists call "human capital.Collective energy com
prises a significant component of "social capital," the accumulation of in
terpersonal connections that facilitate collective action. For Tocqueville, in
dividual and collective energy can serve non-political functions, yet when
necessary they can be channeled into political institutions and the
processes of self-government. But the metaphor of "energy" has an added
advantage over "capital" for helping us to think about democracy's health
because we can apply it to governments as well as to individuals and
groups. Democracy requires an energetic citizenry but also an energetic gov
ernment. Without the latter, democracy would fall to internal crises or ex
ternal enemies; without the former, citizens would be at their government's
mercy. The same point is not so easily made using the "capital" metaphor.
Tocqueville's new political science also teaches us that energy and atten
tion must be encouraged, limited, and channeled toward various coopera
tive projects, and sometimes toward self-government, but that a soft or fem
inine touch may elicit better results than forceful coercion. In our current
mania to stem die tide of political apathy among the young, many middle
schools and high schools are requiring so-called civic engagement from their
students.^^ Tocqueville supplies reasons to doubt the programs' efficacy if
not their sincerity, because they seek to attract energy and attention without
"the free concurrence of (students'] wills." Because "man is so made that he
prefers standing still to marching without independence toward a goal of
which he is ignorant," such mandatory measures could, "without perceiv
ing it, [drive] away the objea of [their] covetousness . .." (DA, 515, 87). If
we take Tocqueville seriously we must take citizens' tastes seriously as well,
because quite often attention follows tastes (and energy follows attention).
Rather than coercing attention and energy we can attempt to attract them to
cooperative pursuits, including self-government, by appealing to people's
tastes. The trick, of course, is to make politics appealing but not tawdry or
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shallow to the point of meaninglessness. We might also provide greater in
centives for satisfying participation, delegating more power to localities and
hence helping local politics appeal to the "ambitious passions of the hu
man heart" (DA, 64). And aside from eliciting additional attention and en
ergy to politics and self-government, we might revise our political institu
tions so that they utilize and channel existing political attention and energy
more efficaciously. The energy need not be manly or womanly as long as it
is potent, pooled, and convertible into cooperative political activism or re
sistance when the need arises.
Finally, if we take Tocqueville seriously we must take not only masculine
but also feminine traits seriously as political virtues. Restraint, judgment,
and respect for appropriate limitations, along with understated mastery that
guides rather than dominates—all of which Tocqueville associates with
women—might serve the home and hearth quite well, but we omit them
from political life at our peril. Democracy without energy faces impotence
and irrelevance at best, and submission to despotic masters at worst. But en
ergetic democracy without restraint and judgment could end the world with
a bang, not a whimper.^'* As noted earlier, I am not making the ambitious
claim that all citizens must combine masculine and feminine virtues within
themselves; that might be asking for the impossible or even the inadvisable.
Metrosexual manliness characterizes the combinations that political science
must effect within, and apply to, society as a whole. Tocqueville's democ
racy requires feminine as well as masculine virtues, and well-channeled en
ergy from anyone who can provide it.

CONCLUSION
Earlier I offered two justifications for my titular term, "metrosexual manli
ness." Upon reflection I should add a third: its potentially controversial ve
neer might attract readers' attention to deeper points underneath. Harvey
Mansfield has taught many of us about the value of getting attention, at
least those of us who have cared to reflect on his words. Teachers must be
able to reach a wide range of students, conveying knowledge and tech
niques that everyone should possess, and then, with students whose tastes,
habits, and abilities prompt deeper reflection, giving those few what they
deserve as well. Metrosexual manliness is a silly concept that contains se
rious ideas. Democracy needs more energy, toughness, and moral courage,
as well as more humanity, moderation, and moral restraint from its men
and women. Which situations require which traits? From whom should we
expect them? How will we elicit them? Answering those questions is the
business of political philosophy and political science—or, at least, it
should be.
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NOTES
1. Harvey C. Mansfield, Manliness (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2006).
2. Cf. Sharon Krause, Liberalism with Honor (Cambridge: Harvard University
Press, 2002); Andrew Sabi, Ruling Passions: Political Offices and Democratic Ethics
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2002); Chad Noyes, "The Birth of Political
Science" (Ph.D. dissertation. Harvard University, 2003); Berger, Attention Deficit De
mocracy and the End of Civic Engagement (forthcoming),
3. Alexis de Tocqueville, Democracy in America, trans. Harvey C. Mansfield and
Delba Winthrop (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2000). Hereafter cited in
text as "DA" followed by page number.
4. Of course, Mansfield's manliness describes an individual's virtues, whereas my
"metrosexual manliness" characterizes Tocqueville's prescription for democracy's
health.
5. Paul McFedries defines a metrosexual as a straight man "who is not afraid to
embrace his rfeminine side." Paul McFedries, "Metrosexual, The Word Spy,
http://www.wordspy.com/words/metrosaaial.asp (September 4, 2002). I use this
sense of "metrosexual" rather than in the pejorative sense of a narcissist who dotes
excessively on his appearance and lifestyle (which McFedries also associates with the
term).
6. For Tocqueville's energetic women see, for example, DA 566-67. He admires
not only the "indomitable energy" of American women but the femininity with
which they maintain and employ it (DA, 574).
7. William Shakespeare, Macbeth (New York: Pocket Books, 1959), I, v, 44-58.
8. Spenser, Edmund, The Faerie Queene (New York: Penguin Classics, 1979),
book III, canto XI, 471-76.
9. See, for example, Robert Bellah, Habits of the Heart: Individualism and Com
mitment in American Life (New York: Harper and Row, 1986); Benjamin Barber, A
Place for Us: How to Make Society Civil and Democracy Strong (New York: Hill and
Wang, 1998); and Robert Putnam, Bowling Alone: The Collapse and Revival of Ameri
can Community (New York: Simon and Schuster, 2000).
10. As one example of voluntary disengagement; Democratic citizens' "habits
and sentiments predispose them to recognize" a great centra! power and even 'to
lend it a hand." Tocqueville continues, "(njot only do [democratic citizens] not nat
urally have the taste to occupy themselves with the public, but often they lack the
time to do it. Private life is so aaive in demoaatic times, so agitated, so filled with
desires and work, that hardly any energy or leisure remains to each man for politi
cal life" (DA, 643).
11. DA, 643. Tocqueville's analyses of citizen disengagement and its causes are far
too complex for simple encapsulation. I aim only to draw out those elements ofToc
queville's analysis that connea citizen disengagement and atomization to difficul
ties with political attention, energy, and perspeaive. The limitations of those human
capacities can explain sufficiently, albeit not exhaustively, why citizens might vol
untarily disengage from politics and self-government at the risk of their own long
term interests
12. DA, 515. The context of this quote is Tocqueville's admonition against exces
sive greed that can undermine material prosperity itself.
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13. Here I refer to the original French and include various forms of energie, in
cluding 4nergique (energetic) and inergiquement (energetically).
14. Aristotle, DeAnima, trans. Hippoaates G. Apostle (Grinnell: Peripatetic Press.
1981), 412a22-8; Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, trans. Terence Irwin (Indianapolis:
Hackett Publishing Company, 1985), 1153al0.
15. For the stru^e between thumos and eros consider, for example, the story of
Leontius in Plato's Republic. Leontius 'noticed corpses lying by the public execu
tioner. He desired to look, but at the same time he was disgusted and made himself
turn away; and for a while he struggled and covered his face.' Even when he is "over
powered by the desire' he rebukes himself in shame. Plato, The Republic of Plato,
trans. Allan Bloom (New York: Basic Books, 1968), 439e.
16. See Aristotle's Politics on the relationship of thumos (or "spiritedness") to pol
itics and also freedom: 'Both the element of ruling and the element of freedom
stem from this capacity [thumos] for everyone: spiritedness is a thing expert at ruling
and indomitable." Aristotle, The Politics, trans. Carnes Lord (Chicago: University of
Chicago Press, 1984), 1328a5.
17. Alexis de Tocqueville, The Old Regime and the Revolution, ed. Francois Furet
and Fran^oise Mdonio, trans. Alan S. Kahan (Chicago: University of Chicago Press,
1998), 173. Hereafter cited in the text as “OR” followed by page number.
18. "The most famous ancient republics had never admired a firmer courage,
prouder souls, a more intractable love of independence than was then hiding in the
wild woods of the New World" (DA, 25). See also DA, 322.
19. OR. 104: ". . . mais I'artivite, I'eneigie, le patriotisme communal, les vertus
males et fecondes qu'elles ont inspirees ont disparu."
20. DA, 574. To be fair, Tocqueville's sentence concludes, "although they some
times show themselves to be men in mind and heart." But he intends this remark as
a front-handed rather than backhanded compliment.
21. Joshua Mitchell also emphasizes the importance of motion in Tocqueville's
thought, although for wholly different reasons relating to the psychological effects
of boundaries and restraints on people's motion. Joshua Mitchell, The Fragility of
Freedom: Tocqueville on Religion, Democracy, and the American Future (Chicago: Uni
versity of Chicago Press, 1995), 29-33.
22. DA, 332. While energy, movement, and freedom are intimately conneaed,
the same holds true for the obverse combination (enervation, immobility, and the
absence of freedom); "Man is so made that he prefers standing still to marching
without independence toward a goal of which he is ignorant" (DA, 87).
23. For Arendt in "On Violence," true power (as opposed to brute force) 'corre
sponds to the human ability not just to act but to act in concert... it belongs to a
group and remains in existence only so long as the group keeps together." Hannah
Arendt, Crises of the “Republic” (New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1972), 143.
24. "... I cannot conceive that a nation can liv^ or above all prosper, without
strong government centralization' (DA, 87-89). Of course, centralized government
differs from centralized administration. The former consists of concentrating "certain
interests . . . common to all parts of the nation ... in the same place or under the
same directing power." The latter consists of concentrating 'other interests special to
certain parts of the nation, such as ... the undertakings of the township." Adminis
trative centralization—remote, bureaucratic oversight of local interests and
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affairs—saps local energy, limits the experience of self-government, and dulls the
taste for the experience of freedom.
25. Alexander Hamilton, James Madison, and John Jay, The Federalist Papers, ed.
Clinton Rossiter (Nev^ York: Mentor, 1961), no. 37, p. 226. Hereafter cited in the
text as ‘Federalist.’'
26. Tocqueville's one exception: .. one will not make anyone believe that a lib
eral, energetic, and wise government can ever issue form the suffrage of a people of
servants" (DA, 665).
27. Tocqueville's writings on soft and harsh despotism strongly influenced Han
nah Arendt, who writes that "the rule by nobody is not necessarily no-rule; it may
indeed, under certain circumstances, even turn out to be one of its crudest and most
tyrannical versions." Hannah Arendt, The Human Condition (Chicago: University of
Chicago Press, 1998), 40.
28. "It seems as if the French people were like those supposedly elementary partides inside which, the more dosely it looks, modem physics keeps finding new partides" (OR, 16>),.
29. "Iron band" is Arendt's term for the overly close compression that totalitari
anism enforces; "mass society" is her term for atomized individuals. Both apply well
to the social and political extremes thatTocqueville fears.
30. Joshua Mitchell expertly analyzes Tocqueville's reliance upon religion to re
strain democratic energy while maintaining democratic freedom. See Mitchell,
Fragility, especially chapter 4 ("Christianity and Demoaacy"),
31. Cf. Emile Durkheim, Suicide (New York: Free Press, 1951), 252: "It is not true,
then, that human activity can be released from all restraint. Nothing in the world
can enjoy such a privilege . . . Man's characteristic privilege is that the bond he ac
cepts is not physical but moral..." See also Barry Schwartz, The Paradox of Choice:
Why More Is Less (New York: Harper Perennial, 2005). Note that Tocqueville does
not endorse state censorship of thought and expression, and he protests against the
"tyranny of the majority" over the same. Apparently he considers religious striaures
to be "salutary" because individuals can more easily defy or leave a religion than
they can defy or leave their state or society.
32. "When, on leaving the agitations of the political world, the American returns
to the bosom of his family, he immediately meets the image of order and peace.
There, all his pleasures are simple and natural, his joys innocent and tranquil; and
as he arrives at happiness through regularity of life, he becomes habituated to regu
lating his opinions as well as his tastes without difficulty" (DA, 279).
33. Aristotle Politics, 1259b35. Of course, Aristotle does not himself consider
women as active citizens.
34. Tocqueville's stated purpose in Democracy in America is "to see not differently
but further" (DA, 15). In the Old Regime he desires "to see into the heart of the old
regime, so close to us in years, but hidden from us by the Revolution" (OR, 84). Fur
ther, on more than a dozen occasions in Democracy in America Tocqueville distin
guishes what is apparent "at first glance" ("au premier coup d'ceiT) and what turns
out to be true upon more attentive analysis.
35. Note that France and the other European aristocracies that Tocqueville takes
as his historical subjects—being based on inherited wealth and privilege rather than
virtue or wisdom—surely do not represent aristocracy at its best (and leave us to
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wonder whether a 'best" aristocracy is purely hypothetical). Tocqueville observes
considerable corruption and pettiness in those societies, and with regard to the
coming Revolution, he says that the French aristocrats suffered from a "strange
blindness" because "their minds had frozen in their ancestors' point of view" {OR,
198). I do not claim, or care to verify, that aristocratic perspective was ever as clear
and far-reaching as Tocqueville occasionally suggests. I claim only that Tocqueville's
account of clear perspeaive enduringly describes the foresight and judgment that
democracy needs but struggles to attain.
36. Tocqueville's insights echo Hamilton's: 'the people always intend the public
good, but they often mistake the means," Federalist, no. 71, 432. Tocqueville quotes
this very passage at length, DA, 144n.
37. Providing such perspective is one function of the "new political science" that
is needed for a world altogether new" (DA, 7). Tocqueville can look upon America
with fresh eyes, unlike some of the chauvinistic Americans whose perspeaive is
warped by their patriotic attachment.
38. "The doctrine of self-interest well understood seems to me of all philosophic
theories the most appropriate to the needs of men in our times . . . Even should
(modem moralists) judge it imperfect, they would still have to adopt it as necessary"
(DA, 503).
39. For Tocqueville's observations regarding the American West, see DA, 50; for
the South, see DA, 331-48.
40. Against such habitual blindness, or at least myopia. Tocqueville plays the role
of Kent to the people's King Lear; "See better, Lear, and let me still remain/ the true
blank of thine eye' William Shakespeare, King Lear, ed. Alfred Harbage (Baltimore:
Penguin Books, 1970), I.i, 169-70.
41. To recall Hamilton's phrase such an occurrence is "more ardently to be
wished than seriously to be expeaed" {Federalist, no. 1, 33).
42. 'To choose to limit choice in this way might be called constitutionalizing or
formalizing behavior.” Harvey C. Mansfield, America’s Constitutional Soul (Baltimore:
Johns Hopkins University Press, 1991), 143.
43. The limited scope of this projea prevents a proper exposition of religion's
role in Tocqueville's analysis. That job has been ably undertaken by many scholars,
including Mitchell, Fragility, and Sanford Kessler, Tocqueville's Civil Religion: American
Christianity and the Prospects for Freedom (Albany: State University of New York Press,
1994).
44. In other words, while "One must. . . expea that individual interest will be
come more than ever the principal if not the unique motive of men's aaions," still
"it remains to know how each man will understand his individual interest" (DA,
503).
45. Tocqueville cites this old French maxim in OR, 199. Its message closely
echoes Soaates's observation of democratic excesses in the Republic: "too much free
dom seems to change into nothing but too much slavery, both for private man and
city' (Plato. Republic, 564a).
46. In this regard Tocqueville follows Aristotle, whose Rhetoric addresses the na
ture and manipulability of attention. Aristotle writes that "all men are accustomed
to devote their attention to what they like and admire," and that, with regard to au
ral attention, "hearers pay most attention to things that are important, that concern
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their own interests, that are astonishing, that are agreeable . . Aristotle, Rhetoric,
trans. W. Rhys Roberts (Mineola: Dover Publications, 2004), 5.15.
47. William James's psychological theories also strongly support Tocqueville's
contentions: "No matter how scatterbrained the type of a man's successive fields of
consciousness may be, if he really cares for a subject, he will return to it incessantly
from his incessant wanderings, and first and last do more with it, and get more re
sults from it, than another person whose attention may be more continuous during
a given interval, but whose passion for the subject is of a more languid and less per
manent sort." William James, Talks to Teachers on Psychology and to Students on Life's
Ideals (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1983).
48. Consider Tocqueville's comparison of Ohio and Kentucky, the former a free
state and the latter a slave state where the ideal of labor has been devalued (DA,
333).
49. DA, 528. The public's "regard" (les regards) here carries the sense of "atten
tion," as the Lawrence translation has it. In the Old Regime Tocqueville depicts the
French royal court's public appeal in the same manner, as a "brilliant" force that at
tracts public regard: "they were, in short, that which most struck contemporaries'
eyes and too often monopolizes posterity's attention" (OR, 121).
50. Crises are especially dangerous during periods when citizens' materialism has
outstripped their civic education or perspective. At such times, 'the exercise of [citi
zens'] political duties appears to them a distressing contretemps that distracts them
from their industry . . . they cannot waste their precious time in useless work."
Rather than focusing their attention on threats to their liberty, preoccupied citizens
are prone to cede their liberty to a designing individual or faction (DA, 515).
51. "... what seems to me most to be feared is that in the midst of the small in
cessant occupations of private life, ambition will lose its spark and its greatness; that
human passions will be appeased and debased at the same time, so that each day
the aspea of the social body becomes more tranquil and less lofty" (DA, 604).
52. DA, 419. The French is ‘elle tend a les isoler les uns des autres, pour porter chacun d'eux d ne s'occuper que de lui seul." Tocqueville generally uses the verb s'occuper
in the sense of occupying one's own attention, so another way to render this passage
is found in Henry Reeve's translation: equality brings each citizen "to focus his at
tention on himself" Alexis de Tocqueville, Democracy in America, trans. Henry Reeve
(New York: Vintage Books, 1990).
53. Elsewhere, analyzing the democratic danger of military coups, Tocqueville
blames "the love of material enjoyments and taste for well-being that equality nat
urally suggests to men," which is naturally opposed to energy, to "virile mores," and
is "antipathetic to the military spirit..." Were the nation to become thus softened,
"the army would take up its arms without ardor and would use them without en
ergy • • ■"
^02, note XXIII).
54. Cf Bryan Caplan, The Myth of the Rational Voter: Why Democracies Choose Bad
Policies (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2007); Ilya Somin, "Voter Ignorance
and the Democratic Ideal," Critical Review 12 (4) (1998): 413-58.
55. Rational choice theory specifies that "in acting rationally, an aaor is engag
ing in some kind of optimization," which may be construed as "maximizing utility."
James S. Coleman and Thomas J. Fararo, Rational Choice Theory: Advocacy and Cri
tique, ed. James S. Coleman and Thomas J. Fararo (Newbury Park: Sage, 1992), xi.
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56. When Tocqueville writes that 'the New England township unites two advan
tages that, everywhere they are found, keenly excite men's interest; that is to say: in
dependence and power," he uses the term "interest" (I'int^et) in the sense of "at
tention* or "regard." The township's advantages appeal to people's desires and
hence excite their attention (DA, 63-64).
57. Almond and Verba's classic study of citizen engagement employs the term
'subjective competence" to describe citizens' self-confidence and perceptions of po
litical efficacy: 'a subjectively competent citizen... is more likely to be an active cit
izen." Gabriel A. Almond and Sidney Verba, The Civic Culture (Princeton: Princeton
University Press, 1963), 182. See also Sidney Verba, Kay Schlozman, and Henry E.
Brady, Voice and Equality (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1995), 346-47.
58. 'One is occupied with the general interest at first by necessity and then by
choice; what was calculation becomes instinct; and by dint of working for the good
of one's fellow citizens, one finally picks up the habit and taste of serving them"
(DA, 488). Note that 'by necessity" does not mean "by coercion"; citizens serve the
public interest because they need each other.
59. "In democracies the people, constantly occupied as they are with affairs and
jealous of their rights, prevent their representatives from deviating from a general
line indicated by their interests" (DA, 233). The experience of political engagement
not only keeps political attention alerted to possible encroachments; additionally,
the occasional disorders of public life, "the little shocks that freedom continually
gives the most secure societies," keeps political attention focused and "keep[s]
awake public prudence" against long-term threats to self-government (OR, 199).
60. See Theda Skocpol, "The Tocqueville Problem: Civic Engagement in Ameri
can Democracy," Social Science History 21 (4) (Winter 1997): 455-79.
61. Cf. Putnam, Bowling Alone; and'Theda Skocpol and Morris P.Fiorina, Civic En
gagement in American Democrcy (Washington: Brookings Institution Press, 2000).
62. Cf. Verba, Schlozman, and Brady, Voice and Equality, 79.
63. In some cases, civil associations 'instead of directing the minds of citizens to
ward public affairs ... serve to distraa them and, engaging them more and more in
projects that cannot be accomplished without public peace, turn them away from
revolutions" (DA, 499).
64. Contrasting the effects of 'freedom and servitude," Tocqueville finds that on
the Kentucky banks of the Ohio River 'one would say that society is asleep; man
seems idle." But on the Kentucky side 'rises a confused noise that proclaims from
afar the presence of industry . . . man appears rich and content: he works* (DA,
331-32).
65. Similarly, regarding American associational life around the turn of the twen
tieth century, Robert Putnam and Gerald Gamm speculate that small and medium
sized cities were the sites of many civic associations because they lacked other en
tertainment options. Gamm and Putnam, "The Growth of Voluntary Associations in
America, 1840-1940," The Journal of Interdiscipliruiry History 29 (4) (Spring 1999):
549.
66. Benjamin Franklin, recounting the success of his early lending library, stresses
the absence of competing attractions for the people's attention; "... reading became
fashionable; and our people, having no public amusements to divert their attention
from study, became better acquainted with books, and in a few years were observed
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by strangers to be better instructed and more intelligent than people of the same
rank generally are in other countries.” Benjamin Franklin, Autobiography and Other
Works (New York: Penguin Books, 1986), 13-15.

67. For example: The Anglo-Americans ... admit that what seems good to them
today can be replaced tomorrow by the better that is still hidden
359).
68. "As he cannot know them all well, he is easily satisfied with imperfect no
tions" (DA, 584).
. , , .
c ■
69. When Tocqueville writes, in this footnote, of I'apathie g^erale he is referring
to the condition of "an innumerable aowd of like and equal men who r^olve on
themselves without repose, procuring the small and vulgar pleasures with which
they fill their souls. Each of them, withdrawn and apart, is like a stranger to the des
tiny of all the others . . (DA, 663). Such a condition is exacUy what I have been
calling a lack of political attention and hence perspective.
70. "During my stay in the United States 1 had remarked that a democratic social
state like that of the Americans could singularly facilitate the establishment of des
potism ..." (DA, 661).
^ n-u.
71. Cf. Putnam, Bowling Alone; and Stephen Macedo et. al., Democra^ at HtsK.
How Political Choices Undermine Citizen Participation (Washington: Brookings Insti
tution Press, 2005).
. 1»A
72 James S Coleman, "Social Capital in the Creation of Human Capital. Americart loumal of Sociology, Supplement (1994): S95-S120. Putnam has attributed the
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